The Power of a Bad Example - A Field Experiment in Household Garbage Disposal

45 Pages Posted: 9 May 2014

See all articles by Robert Dur

Robert Dur

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Department of Economics; Tinbergen Institute; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute); IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Ben Vollaard

CentER, Tilburg University

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: April 8, 2014

Abstract

Field-experimental studies have shown that people litter more in more littered environments. Inspired by these findings, many cities around the world have adopted policies to quickly remove litter. While such policies may prevent people from following the bad example of litterers, they may also invite free-riding on public cleaning services. We are the first to show that both forces are at play. We conduct a natural field experiment where, in a randomly assigned part of a residential area, the frequency of cleaning was drastically reduced during a three-month period. We find evidence that some people start to clean up after themselves when public cleaning services are diminished. However, the tendency to litter more dominates. We also find that these responses continue to exist for some time after the treatment has ended.

Keywords: littering, public services, free-riding, field experiment

JEL Classification: C930, H400, K420

Suggested Citation

Dur, Robert and Vollaard, Ben, The Power of a Bad Example - A Field Experiment in Household Garbage Disposal (April 8, 2014). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 4753, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2434459 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2434459

Robert Dur (Contact Author)

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Department of Economics ( email )

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Tinbergen Institute

Amsterdam/Rotterdam
Netherlands

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

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Munich, DE-81679
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IZA Institute of Labor Economics

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Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Ben Vollaard

CentER, Tilburg University ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

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