Employment Protection, Threat and Incentive Effects on Worker Absence

26 Pages Posted: 9 May 2014

See all articles by Steve Bradley

Steve Bradley

Lancaster University

Colin P. Green

Department of Economics

Gareth Leeves

University of Queensland - School of Economics

Date Written: June 2014

Abstract

This article provides new evidence on the effect of changes in employment protection on worker absence. We use novel multi‐organization data to examine changes in worker absence as workers move from temporary to permanent employment contracts. We demonstrate a robust positive effect of employment protection on sickness absence. It has also been suggested that the impact of employment protection on absence and effort is due to a fear of dismissal. We also provide evidence that suggests that temporary workers' absence is influenced by incentives to attain jobs with protection that is unrelated to threat of dismissal. This has not been considered in earlier research. This channel of employment protection effects has important policy implications.

Suggested Citation

Bradley, Steve and Green, Colin P. and Leeves, Gareth, Employment Protection, Threat and Incentive Effects on Worker Absence (June 2014). British Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol. 52, Issue 2, pp. 333-358, 2014, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2434871 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8543.2012.00916.x

Steve Bradley (Contact Author)

Lancaster University ( email )

The Management School
Department of Economics
Lancaster LA1 4YX
United Kingdom
+44 1524 593880 (Phone)
+44 1524 594244 (Fax)

Colin P. Green

Department of Economics ( email )

Høgskoleringen
Trondheim NO-7491, 7491
Norway

Gareth Leeves

University of Queensland - School of Economics ( email )

Brisbane, QLD 4072
Australia

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