Polycentrism, Federalism, and Liberty: A Comparative Systems Perspective

31 Pages Posted: 12 May 2014

See all articles by Richard E. Wagner

Richard E. Wagner

George Mason University - Department of Economics; George Mason University - Mercatus Center

Akira Yokoyama

Chuo University - Graduate School and Faculty of Policy Studies

Date Written: May 10, 2014

Abstract

Federalism is commonly thought to be a pro-liberty system of government, in contrast to a unitary system. Within a unitary system, people face but a single government that taxes and regulates. Within federal systems, however, people face two or more governments that tax and regulate. In light of this multiplicity of independent governments, it is reasonable to wonder why federalism is widely thought to be favorable to liberty. Whether federalism is or is not favorable to liberty depends on some institutional features of a federalist system. In particular, we distinguish between two systems of federalist governance: competitive federalism and cartel federalism. Where competitive federalism entails competition among all units of government, cartel federalism entails collusion among governments. Competitive federalism has a polycentric structure where no single government dominates the other governments. In contrast, cartel federalism has a monocentric structure that is dominated by the cartelizing unit of government.

Keywords: Polycentricity; Competitive federalism; Cartel federalism; Decentralization; Political externalities

JEL Classification: A12; D7; H2; H77

Suggested Citation

Wagner, Richard E. and Yokoyama, Akira, Polycentrism, Federalism, and Liberty: A Comparative Systems Perspective (May 10, 2014). GMU Working Paper in Economics No. 14-10, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2435537 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2435537

Richard E. Wagner (Contact Author)

George Mason University - Department of Economics ( email )

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HOME PAGE: http://mason.gmu.edu/~rwagner/

George Mason University - Mercatus Center ( email )

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HOME PAGE: http://ppe.mercatus.org/scholars/richard-wagner

Akira Yokoyama

Chuo University - Graduate School and Faculty of Policy Studies ( email )

2nd floor Blg 4 Tampa Campus
742-1 Higashinakano, Hachioji
Tokyo 192-03
Japan

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