Network Expansion to Mitigate Market Power: How Increased Integration Fosters Welfare

29 Pages Posted: 14 May 2014

See all articles by Alexander Zerrahn

Alexander Zerrahn

German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin)

Daniel Huppmann

International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA)

Date Written: May 2014

Abstract

Lack of transmission capacity hampers the integration of the European electricity market, and thereby precludes reaping the full benefits of competition. We investigate the extent to which transmission grid expansion promotes competition, efficiency and welfare. This work proposes a three-stage model for grid investment: a benevolent planner decides on network upgrades, considering welfare benefits of investments through a reduction of market power exertion by strategic generators. These firms anticipate their impact on market clearing, in particular when lines are congested. To this end, we provide the first model effectively endogenizing the trade-off between costs of grid investment and benefits by reduced market power potential. In a three-node network, we illustrate three distinct strategic effects: firstly, by reducing market power exertion, network expansion can promote welfare beyond pure efficiency gains: optimally accounting for strategic generator behavior can push welfare close to a first-best competitive benchmark. Secondly, network upgrades entail a relative shift of rents from producers to consumers, and thirdly, they may yield suboptimal or even disequilibrium outcomes when strategic behavior is neglected.

Keywords: market power, electricity transmission, network expansion, Generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE), mixed-integer equilibrium problem under equilibrium constraints (MIEPEC)

JEL Classification: L13, L51, C61

Suggested Citation

Zerrahn, Alexander and Huppmann, Daniel, Network Expansion to Mitigate Market Power: How Increased Integration Fosters Welfare (May 2014). DIW Berlin Discussion Paper No. 1380, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2435896 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2435896

Alexander Zerrahn (Contact Author)

German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin) ( email )

Mohrenstra├če 58
Berlin, 10117
Germany

Daniel Huppmann

International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) ( email )

Schlossplatz 1
Laxenburg, A-2361
Austria

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