Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and the Comparison of Information Structures in Games

41 Pages Posted: 14 May 2014 Last revised: 22 Oct 2014

See all articles by Dirk Bergemann

Dirk Bergemann

Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics; Yale University - Cowles Foundation

Stephen Morris

Princeton University - Department of Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: October 19, 2014

Abstract

The set of outcomes that can arise in Bayes Nash equilibria of an incomplete information game where players may have access to additional signals beyond the given information structure is equivalent to the set of a version of incomplete information correlated equilibrium which we dub Bayes correlated equilibrium.

A game of incomplete information can be decomposed into a basic game, given by actions sets and payoff functions, and an information structure. We identify a partial order on many player information structures (individual sufficiency) under which more information shrinks the set of Bayes correlated equilibria.

Keywords: Correlated equilibrium, incomplete information, robust predictions, information structure, sufficiency, Blackwell ordering

JEL Classification: C72, D82, D83

Suggested Citation

Bergemann, Dirk and Morris, Stephen Edward, Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and the Comparison of Information Structures in Games (October 19, 2014). Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1909R; Princeton University William S. Dietrich II Economic Theory Center Research Paper No. 054-2013. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2436406 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2436406

Dirk Bergemann (Contact Author)

Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics ( email )

28 Hillhouse Ave
New Haven, CT 06520-8268
United States
203-432-3592 (Phone)
203-432-2128 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.econ.yale.edu/~dirk/

Yale University - Cowles Foundation

Box 208281
New Haven, CT 06520-8281
United States

Stephen Edward Morris

Princeton University - Department of Economics ( email )

Princeton, NJ 08544-1021
United States

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