Inter-Agency Evidence Sharing in Competition Law Enforcement

19(1) International Journal of Evidence and Proof 11 (2015)

30 Pages Posted: 14 May 2014 Last revised: 27 Jan 2015

See all articles by Marek Martyniszyn

Marek Martyniszyn

Queen's University Belfast - School of Law

Abstract

While transnational antitrust enforcement is becoming only more common, the access to foreign-based evidence remains a considerable practical challenge. This article appraises considerations and concerns surrounding confidentiality, and looks into ways of their possible accommodation. It further identifies and critically evaluates the existing mechanisms allowing for inter-agency confidential information/ evidence sharing in competition law enforcement. The article outlines the shortcomings of the current framework and points to novel unilateral approaches. In the latter regard the focus is devoted to Australia, where the competition agency is empowered to share confidential information with foreign counterparts, also without any underlying bilateral agreement and on a non-reciprocal basis. This solution shows that a pragmatic and workable approach to inter-agency evidence sharing can be achieved.

Keywords: competition law enforcement, antitrust law enforcement, transnational enforcement, cooperation agreements, inter-agency cooperation, Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties, MLAT, information gateways, extraterritoriality, evidence in competition cases, confidential information

JEL Classification: K10, K20, K21, K33, K40, K41, K42, K49, L40

Suggested Citation

Martyniszyn, Marek, Inter-Agency Evidence Sharing in Competition Law Enforcement. 19(1) International Journal of Evidence and Proof 11 (2015). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2436467

Marek Martyniszyn (Contact Author)

Queen's University Belfast - School of Law ( email )

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Belfast, Northern Ireland BT7 1NN
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HOME PAGE: http://go.qub.ac.uk/Martyniszyn

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