Capital and Labor Reallocation within Firms

54 Pages Posted: 15 May 2014

See all articles by Xavier Giroud

Xavier Giroud

Columbia Business School - Finance and Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Holger M. Mueller

New York University (NYU) - Department of Finance; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: May 13, 2014

Abstract

We document how a shock to investment opportunities at one plant ("treated plant") spills over to other plants within the same firm, but only if the firm is financially constrained. To provide the treated plant with resources, headquarters withdraws capital and labor from other plants, especially from plants that are relatively less productive, not part of the firm's core industries, and located far away from headquarters. As a result of the resource reallocation, aggregate firm-wide productivity increases. We do not find any evidence of capital or labor spillovers among plants of financially unconstrained firms.

Keywords: Internal Capital Markets, Resource Reallocation

JEL Classification: G31

Suggested Citation

Giroud, Xavier and Mueller, Holger M., Capital and Labor Reallocation within Firms (May 13, 2014). Journal of Finance, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2436552

Xavier Giroud

Columbia Business School - Finance and Economics ( email )

3022 Broadway
New York, NY 10027
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.columbia.edu/~xg2285/

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

Holger M. Mueller (Contact Author)

New York University (NYU) - Department of Finance ( email )

44 West 4th Street
New York, NY 10012-1126
United States
212-998-0341 (Phone)
212-995-4233 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.stern.nyu.edu/~hmueller/

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
107
Abstract Views
1,339
rank
298,312
PlumX Metrics