Does Google Leverage Market Power Through Tying and Bundling?

Journal of Competition Law and Economics 11, no. 2 (June 2015): 365-400

36 Pages Posted: 15 May 2014 Last revised: 25 Jul 2015

Benjamin G. Edelman

Harvard University - HBS Negotiations, Organizations and Markets Unit

Date Written: May 12, 2014

Abstract

I examine Google's pattern and practice of tying to leverage its dominance into new sectors. In particular, I show how Google used these tactics to enter numerous markets, to compel usage of its services, and often to dominate competing offerings. I explore the technical and commercial implementations of these practices, then identify their effects on competition. I conclude that Google's tying tactics are suspect under antitrust law.

Keywords: Competition, antitrust, Google, tying

JEL Classification: K21; L86

Suggested Citation

Edelman, Benjamin G., Does Google Leverage Market Power Through Tying and Bundling? (May 12, 2014). Journal of Competition Law and Economics 11, no. 2 (June 2015): 365-400. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2436940 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2436940

Benjamin G. Edelman (Contact Author)

Harvard University - HBS Negotiations, Organizations and Markets Unit ( email )

Soldiers Field
Boston, MA 02163
United States

HOME PAGE: http://people.hbs.edu/bedelman

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