The Most Persuasive Frankfurt Example, and What It Shows: Or Why Determinism Is Not the Greatest Threat to Moral Responsibility

4 Open Journal of Philosophy 2014

San Diego Legal Studies Paper No. 14-157

4 Pages Posted: 16 May 2014

See all articles by Larry Alexander

Larry Alexander

University of San Diego School of Law

Date Written: May 14, 2014

Abstract

In this paper I argue that even if the Principle of Alterative Possibilities (PAP) is satisfied, moral responsibility is more seriously threatened if the Principle of Alternative Possible Reasons (PAPR) is not satisfied. Nor, I argue, is it clear how it could be satisfied. Finally, I suggest that not only moral responsibility, but also normativity itself, is threatened by the failure to satisfy PAPR.

Keywords: free will, reasons, responsibility, alternative possibilities, normativity

JEL Classification: k10

Suggested Citation

Alexander, Lawrence, The Most Persuasive Frankfurt Example, and What It Shows: Or Why Determinism Is Not the Greatest Threat to Moral Responsibility (May 14, 2014). 4 Open Journal of Philosophy 2014; San Diego Legal Studies Paper No. 14-157. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2437126

Lawrence Alexander (Contact Author)

University of San Diego School of Law ( email )

5998 Alcala Park
San Diego, CA 92110-2492
United States
619-260-2317 (Phone)
619-260-4728 (Fax)

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