International Trade with Endogenous Enforcement of Property Rights

Posted: 8 Feb 2001

See all articles by Louis Hotte

Louis Hotte

University of Ottawa

Ngo Van Long

McGill University - Department of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Huilan Tian

McGill University - Department of Economics

Abstract

We model the endogenous evolution of the de facto property rights regime and explore the impact of trade on de facto property rights regimes and on welfare. The model takes into account the dynamics of the stocks of natural resources, and the effect of trade on resource utilization. We show that the opening of trade can change the de facto property rights regime of an economy. Such changes may lead to a greater stock of resource, but are not always beneficial to society due to the enforcement costs. Thus, the opening of trade can be harmful.

JEL Classification: O13, Q15, O19

Suggested Citation

Hotte, Louis and Van Long, Ngo and Tian, Huilan, International Trade with Endogenous Enforcement of Property Rights. Journal of Development Economics, Vol. 62, No. 1, Pp. 25-54, June 2000. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=243750

Louis Hotte

University of Ottawa ( email )

Department of Economics
55 Laurier E.
Ottawa, Ontario K1N 6N5
Canada
+161 356 25800 1692 (Phone)
+161 356 25999 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://aix1.uottawa.ca/~lhott3/

Ngo Van Long (Contact Author)

McGill University - Department of Economics ( email )

855 Sherbrooke Street West
Montreal, QC H3A 2T7
Canada
514-398-4850 (Phone)
514-398-4938 (Fax)

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Huilan Tian

McGill University - Department of Economics

855 Sherbrooke Street West
Montreal, QC H3A 2T7
CANADA

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