Crowdfunding: Some Empirical Findings and Microeconomic Underpinnings

15 Pages Posted: 16 May 2014 Last revised: 30 Aug 2014

See all articles by Paul Belleflamme

Paul Belleflamme

CORE/LIDAM, UCLouvain (Université Catholique de Louvain); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Thomas Lambert

Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University; Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM)

Date Written: August 30, 2014

Abstract

This article reviews some recent developments in the study of crowdfunding -- i.e., the practice of raising funds through an open call on the Internet. It also shows how microeconomic theory can help us understand some important aspects of crowdfunding that go beyond the finance sphere of the firm. A special attention is devoted to the role and behavior of crowdfunding platforms, which intermediate between entrepreneurs and contributors. Throughout the article, the Belgian market for crowdfunding serves as the main source of illustrations.

Keywords: crowdfunding, multisided platforms, information asymmetry, price discrimination

JEL Classification: G32, L11, L13, L15, L21, L26

Suggested Citation

Belleflamme, Paul and Lambert, Thomas, Crowdfunding: Some Empirical Findings and Microeconomic Underpinnings (August 30, 2014). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2437786 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2437786

Paul Belleflamme

CORE/LIDAM, UCLouvain (Université Catholique de Louvain) ( email )

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HOME PAGE: http://www.paulbelleflamme.com

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

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Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Thomas Lambert (Contact Author)

Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University ( email )

P.O. Box 1738
Rotterdam, 3000 DR
Netherlands

HOME PAGE: http://www.thomaslambert.org

Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM) ( email )

P.O. Box 1738
3000 DR Rotterdam
Netherlands

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