A Way Forward for Tax Law and Economics? A Response to Osofsky's 'Frictions, Screening, and Tax Law Design'

4 Pages Posted: 22 Jun 2014

See all articles by David Gamage

David Gamage

Indiana University Maurer School of Law

Date Written: May 16, 2014

Abstract

This Essay responds to Leigh Osofsky's, "Who’s Naughty and Who’s Nice? Frictions, Screening, and Tax Law Design." Osofsky’s analysis suggests that tax rules might be designed so as to take account both of heterogeneity in taxpayers’ tax planning proclivities and of taxpayer characteristics relevant for distribution. By designing tax rules so as to create frictions that differentially impose higher costs on those taxpayers who are more successfully circumventing existing taxes we can perhaps reform our tax system so as to better achieve equitable distribution at lower efficiency costs. This Essay argues that Osofsky's analysis is generally correct and that it potentially suggests a path toward a more useful law and economics analysis of detailed tax rules.

Suggested Citation

Gamage, David, A Way Forward for Tax Law and Economics? A Response to Osofsky's 'Frictions, Screening, and Tax Law Design' (May 16, 2014). 61 Buffalo Law Review 189, 2014; UC Berkeley Public Law Research Paper No. 2438141. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2438141

David Gamage (Contact Author)

Indiana University Maurer School of Law ( email )

211 S. Indiana Avenue
Bloomington, IN 47405
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.law.indiana.edu/about/people/bio.php?name=gamage-david

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
169
Abstract Views
881
rank
175,817
PlumX Metrics