An Antigua Gambling Model for the International Tax Regime

24 Pages Posted: 23 May 2014  

Adam H. Rosenzweig

Washington University in St. Louis - School of Law

Date Written: May 21, 2014

Abstract

The international tax world is facing a defining moment. While there is little agreement on anything within the field, there appears to be a growing consensus that the modern international tax regime — the so-called flawed miracle emerging from World War II — is irrevocably broken. As the countries of the world confront the challenges facing the international tax regime in the next century, new models for an institutional framework for international tax become increasingly crucial to its success. While significant progress has been made in developing underlying norms to serve as the basis for a modern international tax regime, less focus has been paid to building the institutions and structures necessary to implement these norms. To this end, this Essay proposes looking to the recent experience of the WTO in the Antigua Gambling case as a model for a new institutional framework for the new international tax regime. The Essay then proposes three potential ways to do so: (1) the creditable gross-withholding tax method, (2) the extraterritorial excise tax method, and (3) the WTO cross-retaliation method.

By serving as an example of how to balance the needs of larger, wealthier countries and smaller, poorer ones, the Antigua Gambling model could help overcome one of the largest obstacles confronting the development of a modern international tax regime. Perhaps an Antigua Gambling model could serve as the basis for a new institutional framework for international tax.

Keywords: international tax, tax competition, OECD, BEPS, WTO

JEL Classification: K34

Suggested Citation

Rosenzweig, Adam H., An Antigua Gambling Model for the International Tax Regime (May 21, 2014). Washington University Journal of Law and Policy, Vol. 44, 2014; Washington University in St. Louis Legal Studies Research Paper No. 14-05-03. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2439914

Adam H. Rosenzweig (Contact Author)

Washington University in St. Louis - School of Law ( email )

Campus Box 1120
St. Louis, MO 63130
United States

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