The Gender Gap in Top Corporate Jobs

34 Pages Posted: 30 Sep 2000 Last revised: 4 Sep 2022

See all articles by Marianne Bertrand

Marianne Bertrand

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Kevin F. Hallock

Cornell University; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Date Written: October 2000

Abstract

This paper studies the gender compensation gap among high-level executives in US corporations. We use the ExecuComp data set that contains information on total compensation for the top five highest paid executives of a large group of US firms over the period 1992-1997. About 2.5% of the executives in the sample are women. These women earn about 45% less than their male counterparts. As much as 75% of this gap can be accounted for by the fact that women manage smaller companies and are less likely to be CEO, Chair, or President of their company. The unexplained gender gap can be reduced to less than 5% when one further accounts for the fact that female executives are younger and have less seniority than male executives. Over the period under study, women have nearly tripled their participation in the top executive ranks and have also strongly improved their relative compensation, mostly by gaining representation into the larger corporations. While the absence of a significant gender gap (once we control for measurable characteristics) implies that women and men who hold similar jobs in firms of similar size received fairly equal treatment in terms of compensation, it does not rule out the possibility of discrimination in terms of gender segregation or promotion.

Suggested Citation

Bertrand, Marianne and Hallock, Kevin F., The Gender Gap in Top Corporate Jobs (October 2000). NBER Working Paper No. w7931, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=244029

Marianne Bertrand (Contact Author)

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business ( email )

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Kevin F. Hallock

Cornell University ( email )

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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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