The Political Origin of Home Bias: The Case of Europe

44 Pages Posted: 11 Jul 2014 Last revised: 22 Mar 2016

See all articles by Filippo De Marco

Filippo De Marco

Bocconi University - Department of Finance; Bocconi University - IGIER - Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research

Marco Macchiavelli

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: March 2016

Abstract

We show that politics is at the root of the banks-sovereign nexus that exacerbated the Eurozone crisis. First, government-owned banks or banks with politicians in the board of directors display higher home bias in sovereign debt compared to privately-owned banks throughout the 2010-2013 period. Second, only government-owned banks increased the home bias during the sovereign crisis (moral suasion). We exploit the fact that equity injections (bail-outs) by domestic governments were not directly targeted to political banks to show that, upon receiving such assistance, only government-owned banks purchase domestic debt. Such political pressure is stronger in countries under stress.

Keywords: Banks-sovereign nexus, Home Bias, Political Connections, Bail-outs and government-owned banks, Board of Directors

JEL Classification: G01, G11, D72

Suggested Citation

De Marco, Filippo and Macchiavelli, Marco, The Political Origin of Home Bias: The Case of Europe (March 2016). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2441981 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2441981

Filippo De Marco

Bocconi University - Department of Finance ( email )

Department of Finance
Via Roentgen 1
Milano, MI 20136
Italy

Bocconi University - IGIER - Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research ( email )

Via Roentgen 1
Milan, 20136
Italy

Marco Macchiavelli (Contact Author)

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System ( email )

20th Street and Constitution Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20551
United States

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