The Legal Structure and Regulation of Securities Lending

31 Pages Posted: 29 May 2014

See all articles by Paul Ali

Paul Ali

University of Melbourne - Law School

Ian Ramsay

Melbourne Law School - University of Melbourne

Benjamin Saunders

Deakin University, Geelong, Australia - Deakin Law School

Date Written: May 13, 2014

Abstract

This paper examines the legal structure of securities lending in Australia, and also Europe, the United Kingdom and United States. It provides an analysis of the widely used industry documents, the Australian Master Securities Lending Agreement and the Global Master Securities Lending Agreement (GMSLA). It outlines the regulation of securities lending and short selling, including restrictions on short selling and the applicable disclosure requirements. It discusses the collapse of Opes Prime and the key Federal Court decision which considered the legal effect of the AMSLA. It also outlines the regulatory responses to securities lending and short selling taken by IOSCO, in Europe, the United States and the United Kingdom during the global financial crisis.

Suggested Citation

Ali, Paul and Ramsay, Ian and Saunders, Benjamin, The Legal Structure and Regulation of Securities Lending (May 13, 2014). CIFR Paper No. 022/2014. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2443239 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2443239

Paul Ali (Contact Author)

University of Melbourne - Law School ( email )

University Square
185 Pelham Street, Carlton
Victoria, Victoria 3010
Australia
+61 3 8344 1088 (Phone)
+61 3 8344 5285 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.law.unimelb.edu.au

Ian Ramsay

Melbourne Law School - University of Melbourne ( email )

University Square
185 Pelham Street, Carlton
Victoria, Victoria 3010
Australia
+61 3 8344 5332 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://law.unimelb.edu.au/about/staff/ian-ramsay

Benjamin Saunders

Deakin University, Geelong, Australia - Deakin Law School ( email )

221 Burwood Highway
Burwood
Burwood, Victoria 3125, Victoria 3125
Australia

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