The NCAA's 'Death Penalty' Sanction - Reasonable Self-Governance or an Illegal Group Boycott in Disguise?

36 Pages Posted: 31 May 2014 Last revised: 24 Sep 2014

See all articles by Marc Edelman

Marc Edelman

City University of New York - Baruch College, Zicklin School of Business; Fordham University School of Law

Date Written: 2014

Abstract

This Article examines why the NCAA “death penalty,” although arguably benevolent in its intent, undermines the core principles of federal antitrust law. Part I of this Article discusses the history of college athletics, the NCAA, and the “death penalty” sanction. Part II provides an introduction to section 1 of the Sherman Act and its application to the conduct of both private trade associations and the NCAA. Part III explains why a future challenge to the NCAA “death penalty” could logically lead to a court’s conclusion that the “death penalty” violates section 1 of the Sherman Act. Finally, Part IV explains why Congress should not legislate a special antitrust exemption to insulate the NCAA “death penalty” from antitrust law’s jurisdiction.

Keywords: sports law, sports, antitrust, sports antitrust, NCAA, death penalty, group boycott, Sherman Act, National Collegiate Athletic Association, O'Bannon

JEL Classification: L83, I20, I28, J53, K1, K21, L40, L12, L40, L43, L44, L49, L5, L9

Suggested Citation

Edelman, Marc, The NCAA's 'Death Penalty' Sanction - Reasonable Self-Governance or an Illegal Group Boycott in Disguise? (2014). Lewis & Clark Law Review, Vol. 18, No. 2, 2014. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2443450

Marc Edelman (Contact Author)

City University of New York - Baruch College, Zicklin School of Business ( email )

One Bernard Baruch Way
Box B9-220
New York, NY 10010
United States

Fordham University School of Law ( email )

140 West 62nd Street
New York, NY 10023
United States

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
229
rank
130,991
Abstract Views
1,955
PlumX Metrics