Executive Gender, Competitive Pressures, and Corporate Performance

51 Pages Posted: 1 Jun 2014 Last revised: 25 Sep 2016

See all articles by Mario Daniele Amore

Mario Daniele Amore

Bocconi University - Department of Management and Technology; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Orsola Garofalo

Copenhagen Business School

Date Written: September 24, 2016

Abstract

We investigate whether the gender of top executives influences a firm’s reaction to competitive pressures. Our empirical approach is based on policy changes that varied the exposure of US banks to competition during the late 1990s. Results suggest that while banks with female executives experience significantly higher financial performance under low competition, they tend to underperform when competition increases. At the same time, we find that the presence of female leaders improves the capital stability of banks subject to greater competition. Overall, our study highlights strong interactions between executive gender and market structures in the determination of business outcomes.

Keywords: female executives; banks; competition; performance; risk

JEL Classification: G21; G28; J16

Suggested Citation

Amore, Mario Daniele and Garofalo, Orsola, Executive Gender, Competitive Pressures, and Corporate Performance (September 24, 2016). Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2444080 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2444080

Mario Daniele Amore (Contact Author)

Bocconi University - Department of Management and Technology ( email )

Via Roentgen 1
Milan, MI 20136
Italy

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

Orsola Garofalo

Copenhagen Business School ( email )

Solbjerg Plads 3
Frederiksberg C, DK - 2000
Denmark

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