Homebuilders, Affiliated Financing Arms, and the Mortgage Crisis

14 Pages Posted: 4 Jun 2014

See all articles by Sumit Agarwal

Sumit Agarwal

National University of Singapore

Gene Amromin

Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago

Claudine Madras Gartenberg

Wharton

Anna L. Paulson

Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago

Sriram V. Villupuram

University of Texas at Arlington - Department of Finance and Real Estate

Date Written: June 2, 2014

Abstract

The authors’ findings indicate that homebuilder financing affiliates do make loans to observably riskier borrowers, but the loans made by homebuilders have lower delinquency rates than those made by unaffiliated lenders, even when loan and borrower characteristics are held constant.

Keywords: Homebuilders, Financial Crisis, Finance Arms of Homebuilders, Household Finance, Portfolio Choice, Investment Decisions, Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages

Suggested Citation

Agarwal, Sumit and Amromin, Gene and Gartenberg, Claudine Madras and Paulson, Anna L. and Villupuram, Sriram V., Homebuilders, Affiliated Financing Arms, and the Mortgage Crisis (June 2, 2014). Economic Perspectives, Vol. 38, No. 2, 2014. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2444754

Sumit Agarwal

National University of Singapore ( email )

15 Kent Ridge Drive
Singapore, 117592
Singapore
8118 9025 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.ushakrisna.com

Gene Amromin

Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago ( email )

230 South LaSalle Street
230 S. LaSalle
Chicago, IL 60604
United States
3123225368 (Phone)
3123226011 (Fax)

Claudine Madras Gartenberg

Wharton ( email )

The Wharton School
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6370
United States
2158987755 (Phone)

Anna L. Paulson (Contact Author)

Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago ( email )

230 South LaSalle Street
Chicago, IL 60604
United States
312 322 2169 (Phone)

Sriram V. Villupuram

University of Texas at Arlington - Department of Finance and Real Estate ( email )

Box 19449 UTA
Arlington, TX 76019
United States

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
57
Abstract Views
591
rank
217,129
PlumX Metrics