Preventing Economists' Capture

37 Pages Posted: 2 Jun 2014

See all articles by Luigi Zingales

Luigi Zingales

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

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Date Written: March 2014

Abstract

The very same forces that induce economists to conclude that regulators are captured should lead us to conclude that the economic profession is captured as well. As evidence of this capture, I show that papers whose conclusions are pro-management are more likely to be published in economic journals and more likely to be cited. I also show that business schoolsÂ’ faculty write papers that are more pro management. I highlight possible remedies to reduce the extent of this capture: from a reform of the publication process, to an enhanced data disclosure, from a stronger theoretical foundation to a mechanism of peer pressure. Ultimately, the most important remedy, however, is awareness, an awareness most economists still do not have.

Keywords: Capture, Economics profession, Regulation

JEL Classification: D72, P16, Z13

Suggested Citation

Zingales, Luigi, Preventing Economists' Capture (March 2014). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP9867, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2444888

Luigi Zingales (Contact Author)

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