The Economics of Roscas and Intra-Household Resource Allocation
CentER Working Paper No. 2000-83
38 Pages Posted: 3 Oct 2000
Date Written: July 2000
Abstract
This paper investigates individual motives to participate in rotating savings and credit associations (roscas). Detailed evidence from roscas in a Kenyan slum (Nairobi) suggests that most roscas are predominantly composed of women, particularly those living in a couple and earning an independent income. To explain this phenomenon, we propose an argument based on conflictual interactions within the household. Participation in a rosca is a strategy a wife employs to protect her savings against claims by her husband for immediate consumption. The empirical implications of the model are then tested using the data collected in Kenya.
Keywords: Rosca, Gender, Household
JEL Classification: D10, J16, J12
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?
Recommended Papers
-
Hyperbolic Discount Functions, Undersaving, and Savings Policy
-
Tying Odysseus to the Mast: Evidence from a Commitment Savings Product in the Philippines
By Nava Ashraf, Dean S. Karlan, ...
-
Quasi-Hyperbolic Discounting and Retirement
By Peter A. Diamond and Botond Kőszegi