La cuestionada deseabilidad económica de la business judgment rule en el Derecho español (The Doubtful Economic Desirability of the Business Judgment Rule in Spain)

33 Pages Posted: 5 Jun 2014 Last revised: 16 Sep 2018

See all articles by Aurelio Gurrea-Martínez

Aurelio Gurrea-Martínez

Singapore Management University - School of Law

Date Written: January 20, 2015

Abstract

Spanish Abstract: El presente trabajo pretende evaluar la deseabilidad económica de la business judgment rule en el Derecho español. En este sentido, y a pesar de los beneficios generalmente asociados a la protección de la discrecionalidad empresarial de los administradores sociales, no creemos que la implementación de esta regla resulte necesaria ni, de hecho, deseable en el Derecho español, al menos, en los términos propuestos por la Comisión de Expertos en materia de Gobierno Corporativo y recientemente incorporada en la normativa española de sociedades. En primer lugar, no creemos que la instauración de la business judgment rule resulte necesaria ya que, por lo general, los administradores de las sociedades españolas no se encuentran sometidos a la amenaza creíble de una posible condena por incumplimiento del deber de diligencia. Por otro lado, y aun considerando que fuera necesaria, la existencia de numerosas empresas familiares con accionistas no diversificados y estructuras de capital concentrado podría hacer incluso deseable un cierto grado de aversión al riesgo en los administradores de las sociedades españolas. En nuestra opinión, la norma más deseable sería la de permitir a los propios accionistas la configuración del deber de diligencia conforme a sus propios intereses y, en caso de establecer una norma supletoria en la Ley de Sociedades de Capital, que ésta fuera precisamente la contraria a la propuesta por la Comisión de Expertos: la no protección de los administradores sociales por posibles incumplimientos del deber de diligencia, salvo que lo estatutos sociales establezcan lo contrario. De esta forma, salvo que los accionistas, de manera informada, coordinada y consciente decidieran blindar a los administradores en sus decisiones de gestión, la norma aplicable en España sería la de permitir la revisión judicial de aquellas decisiones empresariales que, a juicio de los accionistas, pudieran suponer un incumplimiento del deber de diligencia.

English Abstract: This paper seeks to assess the economic desirability of the implementation of the business judgment rule in the Spanish Companies Act. In this sense, and despite the benefits generally associated with the business judgment rule, we do not think this measure is either necessary or desirable to be implemented in the Spanish Company Act, at least, in the terms as it has been both proposed by the Group of Experts on Corporate Governance and implemented in the Spanish Companies Act. First, we do not think the implementation of the business judgment rule is necessary because the directors of Spanish companies are not subject to a credible threat of being sued as a result of a breach of the duty of care. On the other hand, and even considering that this rule were necessary in Spain, the existence of many family businesses with non-diversified shareholders and concentrated ownership structures could make even desirable a minimum level of risk aversion in the way the directors of Spanish companies run the firm. In our opinion, the most efficient rule would be to allow the shareholders to design the duty of care according to their interests, and, in case of implementing a default rule in the Spanish Companies Act, this rule should be implemented in the oppossite way: the non-application of the business judgment rule, unless otherwise is established in the bylwas. Thus, unless informed, coordinated and conscious shareholders decide to protect the managers, the applicable rule in Spain would be to allow the judicial revision of those business decisions that, according to the shareholders, may imply a breach of the duty of care.

Note: Downloadable document is in Spanish.

Keywords: business judgment rule, economic desirability, risk aversion, institutional problem, hindsight bias, legal certainty, ownership structure, duty of care, maximization of the value of the firm

JEL Classification: K22

Suggested Citation

Gurrea-Martínez, Aurelio, La cuestionada deseabilidad económica de la business judgment rule en el Derecho español (The Doubtful Economic Desirability of the Business Judgment Rule in Spain) (January 20, 2015). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2445545 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2445545

Aurelio Gurrea-Martínez (Contact Author)

Singapore Management University - School of Law ( email )

55 Armenian Street
Singapore, 179943
Singapore
(+65) 6808-5160 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://https://law.smu.edu.sg/faculty

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