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Governance Delegation Agreements: Shared Sovereignty as a Substitute for Limited Statehood

Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions, 6 Jan 2014

24 Pages Posted: 6 Jun 2014 Last revised: 9 Jun 2014

Aila M. Matanock

University of California, Berkeley - Charles and Louise Travers Department of Political Science

Date Written: 2014

Abstract

Governance delegation agreements — international treaties allowing external actors legal authority within host states for fixed terms — succeed in simple and, under certain conditions, complex state-building tasks. These deals are well institutionalized and have input legitimacy because ratification requires sufficient domestic support from a ruling coalition. In order to obtain that input legitimacy, however, host states constrain external actors commensurate with their level of statehood: Stronger states delegate less legal authority. This article argues that these constraints, which produce joint rather than complete authority, require external actors to work within state structures rather than substituting for them, and thus make coordination of complex tasks more difficult. A quantitative overview of data on consent-based peacekeeping missions complements a qualitative analysis focused on comparative case studies in Melanesia and Central America to test the theory. The results support the theory and suggest that these deals hold promise particularly for accomplishing complex tasks in especially weak states.

Keywords: Governance Delegation Agreements, Shared Sovereignty, Statebuilding, Melanesia, Guatemala, CICIG

Suggested Citation

Matanock, Aila M., Governance Delegation Agreements: Shared Sovereignty as a Substitute for Limited Statehood (2014). Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions, 6 Jan 2014. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2446067

Aila M. Matanock (Contact Author)

University of California, Berkeley - Charles and Louise Travers Department of Political Science ( email )

210 Barrows Hall
Berkeley, CA 94720
United States

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