Discovering Cooperation: A Contractual Approach to Institutional Change in Regional International Organizations

44 Pages Posted: 6 Jun 2014

See all articles by Gary Marks

Gary Marks

University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Political Science Department

Tobias Lenz

University of Goettingen (Göttingen)

Besir Ceka

Davidson College

Brian Michael Burgoon

University of Amsterdam

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Date Written: June 1, 2014

Abstract

This paper offers a fresh perspective on institutional change drawing on recent advances in the economic theory of contracting. Contractual incompleteness enhances organizational flexibility, but only at the cost of perceptual ambiguity. We hypothesize that the willingness to engage in a highly incomplete contract depends on shared understandings which reduce the cost of perceptual ambiguity. These claims are evaluated using a new dataset on delegation of state authority to non-state actors in 35 regional international organizations from 1950 to 2010. We are able to confirm across a wide range of models and specifications that reform is guided by contractual incompleteness and that contractual incompleteness is rooted in shared historical experience.

Keywords: institutional change, regional international organization, contracting, international cooperation

Suggested Citation

Marks, Gary and Lenz, Tobias and Ceka, Besir and Burgoon, Brian Michael, Discovering Cooperation: A Contractual Approach to Institutional Change in Regional International Organizations (June 1, 2014). Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Research Paper No. RSCAS 2014/65, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2446441 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2446441

Gary Marks (Contact Author)

University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Political Science Department ( email )

Chapel Hill, NC 27599
United States

Tobias Lenz

University of Goettingen (Göttingen) ( email )

Platz der Gottinger Sieben 3
Gottingen, D-37073
Germany

Besir Ceka

Davidson College ( email )

Political Science Department
209 Ridge Road
Davidson, NC 28035
United States

Brian Michael Burgoon

University of Amsterdam ( email )

Spui 21
Amsterdam, 1018 WB
Netherlands

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