Monotonic Allocation Schemes in Clan Games

CentER Working Paper No. 80

12 Pages Posted: 23 Nov 2000

See all articles by Mark Voorneveld

Mark Voorneveld

Stockholm School of Economics - Department of Economics

Stef H. Tijs

Tilburg University - Center For Economic Research; Tilburg University - Department of Econometrics & Operations Research; Università degli Studi di Genova - Dipartimento di Matematica

Sofia Grahn

Uppsala University - Department of Economics

Date Written: September 2000

Abstract

Total clan games are characterized using monotonicity, veto power of the clan members, and a concavity condition reflecting the decreasing marginal contribution of non-clan members to growing coalitions. This decreasing marginal contribution is incorporated in the notion of a bi-monotonic allocation scheme, where the value of each coalition is divided over its members in such a way that the clan members receive a higher, and the non-clan members a lower share as the coalitions grow larger. Each core element of a total clan game can be extended to both a population monotonic and a bi-monotonic allocation scheme. In total clan games where the clan consists of a single member (the so-called big boss) the use of the nucleolus as an allocation mechanism gives rise to a bi-monotonic allocation scheme.

Keywords: cooperative games, population monotonic allocation scheme, bi-monotonic allocation scheme, clan games, big boss games

Suggested Citation

Voorneveld, Mark and Tijs, Stef H. and Grahn, Sofia, Monotonic Allocation Schemes in Clan Games (September 2000). CentER Working Paper No. 80, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=244660 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.244660

Mark Voorneveld (Contact Author)

Stockholm School of Economics - Department of Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 6501
Sveavagen 65
S-113 83 Stockholm
Sweden

Stef H. Tijs

Tilburg University - Center For Economic Research ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
B925
5000 LE Tilburg
Netherlands
+31 13 466 2348 (Phone)

Tilburg University - Department of Econometrics & Operations Research ( email )

Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

Università degli Studi di Genova - Dipartimento di Matematica

Via Dodecaneso 35
16146 Genoa
Italy

Sofia Grahn

Uppsala University - Department of Economics

Box 513
SE-75120 Uppsala
Sweden

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