Download This PaperOn Three Shapley-Like Solutions for Cooperative Games with Random Payoffs
Center for Economic Research No. 2000-73
21 Pages Posted: 10 Oct 2000
Date Written: 2000
Abstract
Three solution concepts for cooperative games with random payoffs are introduced. These are the marginal value, the dividend value and the selector value. Inspiration for their definitions comes from several equivalent formulations of the Shapley value for cooperative TU games. An example shows that these solutionscan all be different for cooperative games with random payoffs. Properties are studied and two characterizations on subclasses of games are provided.
Keywords: cooperative games, random variables, Shapley values
JEL Classification: C71
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Timmer, Judith and Borm, Peter E. M. and Tijs, Stef H., On Three Shapley-Like Solutions for Cooperative Games with Random Payoffs (2000). Center for Economic Research No. 2000-73, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=244669 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.244669
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