Bidder Overpayment in Takeovers

64 Pages Posted: 8 Jun 2014

Date Written: February 6, 1989

Abstract

An important portion of shareholder gains likely reflects bidders overpaying for targets. The overpayment is not fully reflected in bidders' share prices, to the extent that investors already expected the bidder to waste money, on acquisitions or other investments.

Suggested Citation

Black, Bernard S., Bidder Overpayment in Takeovers (February 6, 1989). Stanford Law Review, Vol. 41, No. 597-660, 1989, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2447000

Bernard S. Black (Contact Author)

Northwestern University - Pritzker School of Law ( email )

375 E. Chicago Ave
Chicago, IL 60611
United States
312-503-2784 (Phone)

Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management

2001 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL 60208
United States
847-491-5049 (Phone)

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Brussels
Belgium

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