The Compatibility of Deferential Standard of Judicial Review in the EU Competition Proceedings with Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights

Institute for Consumer Antitrust Studies Working Papers, Loyola University Chicago

30 Pages Posted: 11 Jun 2014 Last revised: 21 Oct 2014

See all articles by Maciej Bernatt

Maciej Bernatt

University of Warsaw, Centre for Antitrust and Regulatory Studies

Date Written: June 10, 2014

Abstract

The EU courts have been criticized by competition law scholars for exercising insufficient review when it comes to the EU Commission’s determinations in factual and economic matters. It has also been claimed that the General Court gives the Commission too broad deference when it comes to the assessment of fine for violation of Article 101-102 of the TFEU. Against this background the EU courts judicial review is analyzed from the perspective of Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) in order to answer the question whether deferential standard of review is permissible under the full jurisdiction principle prescribed in Article 6(1) of the ECHR. The analysis of the European Court of Human Rights jurisprudence leads to the conclusion that the way in which the EU Courts currently review the EU Commission’s decisions is not very likely to be found in violation of Article 6 of the ECHR after the EU accesses to the ECHR. However, further improvements of fairness of the administrative process before the Commission should be considered.

Keywords: judicial review, competition proceedings, right to fair trail, Article 6 of ECHR, deference, procedural fairness, due process

JEL Classification: L40, K21, K40, K42

Suggested Citation

Bernatt, Maciej, The Compatibility of Deferential Standard of Judicial Review in the EU Competition Proceedings with Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (June 10, 2014). Institute for Consumer Antitrust Studies Working Papers, Loyola University Chicago. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2447884 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2447884

Maciej Bernatt (Contact Author)

University of Warsaw, Centre for Antitrust and Regulatory Studies ( email )

Warsaw
Poland

HOME PAGE: http://www.cars.wz.uw.edu.pl/news_gb.html

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