Risk Management Under a Prudential Policy

16 Pages Posted: 13 Jun 2014

Date Written: June 11, 2014

Abstract

In this paper, we study the structure of optimal contracts in a banking system when there is no risk of moral hazard. We consider a risk management problem under a policy that reduces the excessive risk taking behavior by making all banks bear part of the risk that they transfer to other parties in the market. First, we characterize the optimal solutions to the risk management problem, and, second, we find a necessary and sufficient condition under which the “risk of the tail events” will not be transferred. In particular, we will study the problem using two known risk measures, Value at Risk and Conditional Value at Risk, and will show that in these cases the optimal solutions are in the form of stop-loss policies.

Keywords: Excessive risk taking, Moral hazard, Value at Risk and Conditional Value at Risk, Risk of tail events

Suggested Citation

Assa, Hirbod, Risk Management Under a Prudential Policy (June 11, 2014). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2448707 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2448707

Hirbod Assa (Contact Author)

University of Liverpool ( email )

Institute for Financial and Actuarial Mathematics,
Liverpool, L18 8BF
United Kingdom
447522173132 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://sites.google.com/site/assahirbod/

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