'Set the Night on Fire!' Mafia Violence and Elections in Italy

Abstract

Does electoral politics explain variation in criminal violence? This paper aims at analyzing the relation between criminal violence and elections in Italy where a large number of mafia-like groups operate. The empirical analysis is drawn from a unique panel data of monthly intimidation attacks reported by police forces in 105 Italian provinces from 1983 to 2003. Through a diff-in-diff design, the paper finds statistical evidence that as elections get close intimidation attacks increase in those provinces with a strong criminal presence. Moreover, this study examines whether mafia-like groups find opportunities for and constraints in using violence depending on the fragmentation of the political market, and on the effectiveness of law-enforcement. These findings are consistent with a large case study literature documenting the intervention of criminal organizations into elections to capture politicians and to engage in rent-seeking in competition with rival groups. The paper we show that criminal violence during elections is positively correlated with local public spending.

Keywords: Electoral Competition, Electoral Fraud, Organized Crime, Political Violence, Rent-seeking