The Peril of Parliamentarism? Executive-Legislative Relations and the Transition to Democracy from Electoral Authoritarian Rule

44 Pages Posted: 18 Aug 2014

See all articles by Masaaki Higashijima

Masaaki Higashijima

University of Michigan; Tohoku University

Yuko Kasuya

Keio University

Date Written: 2014

Abstract

Why do some electoral authoritarian regimes survive for decades while others are short-lived? This paper explores the impact of constitutional structures on the longevity of electoral authoritarianism. We argue that under electoral authoritarian regimes, parliamentary systems permit dictators to survive longer than they do in presidential systems. This is because parliamentary systems incentivize autocrats and ruling elites to institutionalize a dominant party, discourage opposition parties from uniting together at elections, and indirectly allow electoral manipulation in order to achieve an overwhelming victory at the ballot box, such as through gerrymandering and malapportionment. We test our hypothesis using a combination of cross-national statistical analysis and comparative case studies of Malaysia and the Philippines. Employing a cross-national dataset of 170 countries between 1945 and 2010, dynamic logit models provide supporting evidence that electoral authoritarianism within parliamentary systems is less likely to lead a country to democracy than within presidential systems, even after controlling for a series of relevant confounding factors. Two carefully selected case studies have been chosen for comparative analysis, Malaysia’s Barisan National (National Front) regime (1955 to present) and the Philippines’s Marcos regime (1972 to 1986), which elucidate causal mechanisms in the theory.

Suggested Citation

Higashijima, Masaaki and Kasuya, Yuko, The Peril of Parliamentarism? Executive-Legislative Relations and the Transition to Democracy from Electoral Authoritarian Rule (2014). APSA 2014 Annual Meeting Paper, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2452141

Masaaki Higashijima (Contact Author)

University of Michigan ( email )

United States

Tohoku University ( email )

Aramaki aza Aoba 6-3-09
Aoba-ku
Sendai, Miyagi 980-8579
Japan
8109094245721 (Phone)

Yuko Kasuya

Keio University ( email )

2-15-45 Mita
Minato-ku
Tokyo, 108-8345
Japan

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