Orchestrating Global Governance: From Empirical Findings to Theoretical Implications

46 Pages Posted: 14 Jul 2014

See all articles by Kenneth W. Abbott

Kenneth W. Abbott

Arizona State University

Philipp Genschel

European University Institute

Duncan Snidal

Nuffield College, University of Oxford

Bernhard Zangl

Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich

Date Written: 2014

Abstract

This chapter is the conclusion to an edited volume on “orchestration,” a mode of governance widely used by international organizations (IGOs) and other governance actors, but rarely identified or analyzed. IGOs engage in orchestration when they enlist public or private intermediary actors on a voluntary basis, by providing them ideational and material support, to address target actors in pursuit of IGO governance goals. Orchestration is thus both indirect and soft. In the framework paper for the volume, we develop six hypotheses as to the conditions under which governance actors, and IGOs specifically, are likely to rely on orchestration. Twelve chapters then explore IGO orchestration in diverse issue areas, providing empirical evidence on our hypotheses. Here we assess that evidence. Our hypotheses provide valuable explanations of many cases of orchestration (and non-orchestration). But the cases suggest important modifications. Most significantly, we find that states often approve of or initiate IGO orchestration, even when they are its targets. Where states rather than IGOs initiate orchestration, certain factors we hypothesized would foster IGO orchestration – notably goal divergence among member states – actually discourage it.

Keywords: orchestration, global governance, international organizations, non-state actors

Suggested Citation

Abbott, Kenneth Wayne and Genschel, Philipp and Snidal, Duncan and Zangl, Bernhard, Orchestrating Global Governance: From Empirical Findings to Theoretical Implications (2014). APSA 2014 Annual Meeting Paper. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2452764

Kenneth Wayne Abbott (Contact Author)

Arizona State University ( email )

Box 877906
Tempe, AZ 85287-7906
United States
480-965-5917 (Phone)

Philipp Genschel

European University Institute ( email )

Villa Schifanoia
133 via Bocaccio
Firenze (Florence), Tuscany 50014
Italy
+39 055 4685 735 (Phone)

Duncan Snidal

Nuffield College, University of Oxford ( email )

New Road
Oxford, Oxfordshire OX1 1NF
United Kingdom

Bernhard Zangl

Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich ( email )

Geschwister-Scholl-Platz 1
Munich, Bavaria 80539
Germany

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