Strategic Voting and Coalitions

34 Pages Posted: 27 Jun 2014

See all articles by Jon Fraenkel

Jon Fraenkel

Victoria University of Wellington - Te Herenga Waka

Bernard Grofman

University of California, Irvine

Date Written: 2014

Abstract

We examine strategic elements of voter behavior in parliamentary elections where the voting method is a scoring rule other than plurality: the Borda count, which is used for the election of ethnic minorities in Slovenia, and the Dowdall rule, which is used in the Pacific island state of Nauru in multiseat districts. After first examining the general properties of scoring rules, and generating theoretical differences between the two rules, we look at empirical evidence from Nauru and Slovenia. This casts doubt on predictions based simply on a voting rule’s mathematical properties and on the accuracy of assumptions of sincere rank ordering.

Suggested Citation

Fraenkel, Jon and Grofman, Bernard, Strategic Voting and Coalitions (2014). APSA 2014 Annual Meeting Paper, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2453192

Jon Fraenkel (Contact Author)

Victoria University of Wellington - Te Herenga Waka ( email )

P.O. Box 600
Wellington, 6140
New Zealand

Bernard Grofman

University of California, Irvine ( email )

School of Social Sciences
SSPB 2291
Irvine, CA 92697
United States
19497331094 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.socsci.uci.edu/~bgrofman/

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