Open/Closed List and Party Choice: Experimental Evidence from the U.K.

44 Pages Posted: 21 Aug 2014

See all articles by Jack Blumenau

Jack Blumenau

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE)

Andrew C. Eggers

University of Oxford

Dominik Hangartner

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE); Stanford Immigration Policy Lab

Simon Hix

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Department of Government

Date Written: 2014

Abstract

Existing research comparing open-list and closed-list PR electoral systems has highlighted the way in which ballot type a ects candidates' electoral strategies. We depart from this literature by emphasizing that ballot type may also affect the relative success of di erent kinds of parties. When voters have strong opinions about an issue on which major parties are internally divided, open-list ballots give voters an opportunity to express their preference on that issue without having to support a \niche" party. We provide experimental evidence of this phenomenon from the UK, where we show in hypothetical European Parliament elections that using an open-list ballot would shift support from UKIP (the Eurosceptic party) to Eurosceptic candidates of the Conservative Party.

Suggested Citation

Blumenau, Jack and Eggers, Andrew C. and Hangartner, Dominik and Hix, Simon, Open/Closed List and Party Choice: Experimental Evidence from the U.K. (2014). APSA 2014 Annual Meeting Paper. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2453195

Jack Blumenau

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) ( email )

Houghton Street
London, WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom

Andrew C. Eggers

University of Oxford ( email )

Mansfield Road
Oxford, Oxfordshire OX1 4AU
United Kingdom

Dominik Hangartner

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) ( email )

Departments of Government and Methodology
Houghton Street
London, WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom

Stanford Immigration Policy Lab

30 Alta Road
Stanford, CA 94305
United States

Simon Hix (Contact Author)

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Department of Government ( email )

Northampton NN7 1NE
United Kingdom

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