Political Advertising in Consolidating Democracies: Locally Dominant Parties and the Equalization of Media Access in Mexico

67 Pages Posted: 21 Aug 2014 Last revised: 24 Aug 2014

See all articles by Horacio Larreguy

Horacio Larreguy

ITAM

John Marshall

Harvard University

James M. Snyder

Harvard University; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Date Written: 2014

Abstract

To combat disparities in access to political advertising -- an essential challenge for many consolidating democracies where political parties are regionally dominant -- many countries now regulate access to political advertising. Unlike consolidated democracies, where voters are similarly familiar with the policies of the major parties, equalizing political advertising opportunities may particularly benefit political parties that are not locally dominant. Mexico implemented such a reform in 2007, allocating radio and television advertising slots according to national and state vote shares at the previous election. Using detailed signal coverage data, we combine matching techniques with a fuzzy geographic regression discontinuity design to exploit differences in exposure to political advertising caused by cross-state spillovers to identify the effects of political advertising. We show that political advertising -- particularly AM radio -- is effective at increasing the vote share of the PAN and PRD, but not the previously-hegemonic PRI. Consistent with our formal model, PAN and PRD political advertising is most effective in the least informed and politically uncompetitive electoral precincts, and when a facing a locally dominant party of intermediate strength.

Suggested Citation

Larreguy, Horacio and Marshall, John and Snyder, James M., Political Advertising in Consolidating Democracies: Locally Dominant Parties and the Equalization of Media Access in Mexico (2014). APSA 2014 Annual Meeting Paper, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2454757

Horacio Larreguy

ITAM ( email )

Av. Camino a Sta. Teresa 930
Col. Héroes de Padierna
Mexico City, D.F. 01000, Federal District 01080
Mexico
10700 (Fax)

John Marshall (Contact Author)

Harvard University ( email )

1875 Cambridge Street
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

James M. Snyder

Harvard University ( email )

1875 Cambridge Street
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

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