Commitment Problems and Bargaining Failure: Experimental Evidence

1 Pages Posted: 1 Sep 2014

See all articles by David H. Clark

David H. Clark

Binghamton University

William Reed

University of Maryland

Timothy Nordstrom

University of Mississippi

Daniel J Siegel

Independent

Date Written: 2014

Abstract

Bargaining models of war point to two major causes of conflict: asymmetric information, and commitment problems. This paper focuses on the commitment problem, and specifically on how responsive bargainers are to expected changes in win probabilities.

Our goal is to evaluate whether bargainers can identify commitment problems - in lab experiments, we examine subjects' choices between bargaining and fighting, given shifts in win probabilities and costs.

Keywords: bargaining, commitment, experiments

Suggested Citation

Clark, David H. and Reed, William and Nordstrom, Timothy and Siegel, Daniel J, Commitment Problems and Bargaining Failure: Experimental Evidence (2014). APSA 2014 Annual Meeting Paper. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2455185

David H. Clark (Contact Author)

Binghamton University ( email )

Binghamton, NY 13902-6000
United States

William Reed

University of Maryland ( email )

College Park
College Park, MD 20742
United States

Timothy Nordstrom

University of Mississippi ( email )

Oxford, MS 38677
United States

Daniel J Siegel

Independent ( email )

No Address Available

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