Do Practice Rounds Affect Experimental Auction Results?

Posted: 19 Jun 2014

See all articles by Jay R. Corrigan

Jay R. Corrigan

Kenyon College - Department of Economics

Matthew C Rousu

Susquehanna University - Economics

Dinah Pura T. Depositario

University of the Philippines Los Baños - Department of Agribusiness Management

Date Written: January 27, 2014

Abstract

Researchers use practice rounds to familiarize participants with experimental auction mechanisms. We find a positive correlation between practice bids and bids submitted in later rounds. We consider three explanations for this correlation: a behavioral anchoring effect, a tendency for some auction participants to be more free-spending, and misconception of the experimental auction’s demand revealing qualities.

Suggested Citation

Corrigan, Jay R. and Rousu, Matthew C and Depositario, Dinah Pura T., Do Practice Rounds Affect Experimental Auction Results? (January 27, 2014). Economics Letters, Vol. 123, No. 1, 2014, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2455855

Jay R. Corrigan (Contact Author)

Kenyon College - Department of Economics ( email )

Gambier, OH 43022
United States
740-427-5281 (Phone)
740-427-5276 (Fax)

Matthew C Rousu

Susquehanna University - Economics ( email )

Selinsgrove, PA 17870
United States
570 372-4186 (Phone)

Dinah Pura T. Depositario

University of the Philippines Los Baños - Department of Agribusiness Management ( email )

College of Economics and Management
UPLB
Los Baños, Laguna 4031
Philippines

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