A Computational Study of Feasible Repackings in the FCC Incentive Auctions

26 Pages Posted: 20 Jun 2014

See all articles by Michael Kearns

Michael Kearns

University of Pennsylvania

Lili Dworkin

University of Pennsylvania

Date Written: June 18, 2014

Abstract

We report the results of a computational study of repacking in the FCC Incentive Auctions. Our interest lies in the structure and constraints of the solution space of feasible repackings. Our analyses are "mechanism-free," in the sense that they identify constraints that must hold regardless of the reverse auction mechanism chosen or the prices offered for broadcaster clearing. We examine topics such as the amount of spectrum that can be cleared nationwide, the geographic distribution of broadcaster clearings required to reach a clearing target, and the likelihood of reaching clearing targets under various models for broadcaster participation. Our study uses FCC interference data and a satisfiability-checking approach, and elucidates both the unavoidable mathematical constraints on solutions imposed by interference, as well as additional constraints imposed by assumptions on the participation decisions of broadcasters.

Suggested Citation

Kearns, Michael and Dworkin, Lili, A Computational Study of Feasible Repackings in the FCC Incentive Auctions (June 18, 2014). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2456395 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2456395

Michael Kearns

University of Pennsylvania ( email )

Philadelphia, PA 19104-6370
United States

Lili Dworkin (Contact Author)

University of Pennsylvania ( email )

Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States

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