Selective Attention as a Determinant of Escalation Bias in Subjective Performance Evaluation Judgments

Behavioral Research in Accounting, 32(1), 87-100

35 Pages Posted: 25 Jun 2014 Last revised: 8 Apr 2020

See all articles by Stephan Kramer

Stephan Kramer

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Rotterdam School of Management (RSM)

Victor S. Maas

University of Amsterdam - Amsterdam Business School

Date Written: January 1, 2020

Abstract

We use an experiment to examine escalation bias in subjective performance evaluations. Participants assume the role of manager and evaluate the performance of an employee based on a balanced scorecard-type performance report. We manipulate whether managers recommended positively or negatively about the evaluated employee’s promotion to his current position. Consistent with the presence of escalation bias, we find that managers give higher performance ratings to employees about whom they advised positively than to employees about whom they advised negatively. We then examine the role of selective attention in the emergence of this escalation bias. Using eye-tracking data, we investigate whether escalation bias arises because managers with different prior commitments towards the evaluated employee pay attention to different items in the scorecard. We find no evidence that this is the case. Specifically, the eye-tracking data indicate that evaluators’ prior recommendation did not affect what proportion of their visual attention was given to favorable (versus unfavorable) performance measures, and that the relative attention paid to favorable measures is not associated with the performance rating.

Keywords: Performance evaluation, Performance appraisal, Escalation of commitment, Eye-tracking, Balanced scorecard

JEL Classification: M12, M40, M51, M52

Suggested Citation

Kramer, Stephan and Maas, Victor S., Selective Attention as a Determinant of Escalation Bias in Subjective Performance Evaluation Judgments (January 1, 2020). Behavioral Research in Accounting, 32(1), 87-100, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2457941 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2457941

Stephan Kramer (Contact Author)

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Rotterdam School of Management (RSM) ( email )

P.O. Box 1738
Room T08-21
3000 DR Rotterdam, 3000 DR
Netherlands

HOME PAGE: http://www.stephankramer.com

Victor S. Maas

University of Amsterdam - Amsterdam Business School ( email )

Spui 21
Amsterdam, 1018 WB
Netherlands

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