Inequality, Community Participation, and the Allocation of Collective Profits

24 Pages Posted: 24 Jun 2014

See all articles by Jennifer Alix‐Garcia

Jennifer Alix‐Garcia

University of San Francisco - College of Arts & Sciences

Benjamin Cerf

Government of the United States of America - Bureau of the Census

Date Written: July 2014

Abstract

This study analyzes the relationship between inequality in land holdings and participation in community assemblies in Mexican villages. Our identification strategy is unique in that it exploits contemporaneously exogenous variation in inequality due to historic and legal restrictions on the subdivision and sale of parcels in the communities we study. The data show that at an aggregate level, villages with more inequality in land holdings have lower participation rates. Individuals with greater land holdings relative to other community members are more likely to participate. This relationship intensifies with increasing inequality. We also consider how participation influences the allocation of public funds. We find greater investment in public goods where inequality is lower and participation higher. Finally, we demonstrate that those who are less likely to attend meetings are also less likely to receive government subsidies and benefits.

Suggested Citation

Alix-Garcia, Jennifer and Cerf, Benjamin, Inequality, Community Participation, and the Allocation of Collective Profits (July 2014). Economics & Politics, Vol. 26, Issue 2, pp. 285-308, 2014. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2458210 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ecpo.12035

Jennifer Alix-Garcia (Contact Author)

University of San Francisco - College of Arts & Sciences ( email )

San Francisco, CA 94117
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.usfca.edu/artsci/fac_staff/A/alix-garcia_jennifer.html

Benjamin Cerf

Government of the United States of America - Bureau of the Census ( email )

4600 Silver Hill Road
Washington, DC 20233-9100
United States

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