Reform of the United Nations Security Council: Equity and Efficiency

37 Pages Posted: 25 Jun 2014

See all articles by Matthew Gould

Matthew Gould

Brunel University London

Matthew D. Rablen

Brunel University London - Department of Social Sciences, Media and Communications

Date Written: May 24, 2014

Abstract

Twenty years of negotiations over reform of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) are yet to bear fruit. We use recent advances in the theory of a-priori voting power to present a formal quantitative appraisal of the "structural reforms" contained within eleven current reform proposals, and the separate effect of expansion of the UNSC membership. Only two reform proposals – the EU acting as a single entity, or a weakening of the veto power for permanent members – robustly dominate the status quo against our measures of equity and efficiency. Several proposals may actually worsen the issues they ostensibly claim to resolve.

Keywords: United Nations, United Nations Security Council, United Nations Security Council reform, equity, efficiency, voting power, square-root rule

JEL Classification: D72, D71, C71, C63

Suggested Citation

Gould, Matthew and Rablen, Matthew D., Reform of the United Nations Security Council: Equity and Efficiency (May 24, 2014). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 4818. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2458297

Matthew Gould

Brunel University London ( email )

Kingston Lane
Uxbridge, Middlesex UB8 3PH
United Kingdom

Matthew D. Rablen (Contact Author)

Brunel University London - Department of Social Sciences, Media and Communications ( email )

Kingston Lane
Uxbridge, Middlesex UB8 3PH
United Kingdom

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