Open Access to Research Data: Strategic Delay and the Ambiguous Welfare Effects of Mandatory Data Disclosure

Information Economics and Policy, Vol. 42, March 2018, pp. 20-34

Max Planck Institute for Innovation & Competition Research Paper No. 14-09

43 Pages Posted: 28 Jun 2014 Last revised: 2 May 2018

See all articles by Frank Mueller-Langer

Frank Mueller-Langer

University of the Bundeswehr Munich; Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition; European Commission, Joint Research Center

Patrick Andreoli Versbach

Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition; Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich (LMU) - Faculty of Economics

Date Written: June 20, 2014

Abstract

Mandatory data disclosure is an essential feature for credible empirical work but comes at a cost: First, authors might invest less in data generation if they are not the full residual claimants of their data after their first publication. Second, authors might "strategically delay" the time of submission of papers in order to fully exploit their data in subsequent research. We analyze a three-stage model of publication and data disclosure. We derive exact conditions for positive welfare effects of mandatory data disclosure. However, we find that the transition to mandatory data disclosure has negative welfare properties if authors delay strategically.

Keywords: data disclosure policy, strategic delay, welfare effects

Suggested Citation

Mueller-Langer, Frank and Andreoli Versbach, Patrick, Open Access to Research Data: Strategic Delay and the Ambiguous Welfare Effects of Mandatory Data Disclosure (June 20, 2014). Information Economics and Policy, Vol. 42, March 2018, pp. 20-34, Max Planck Institute for Innovation & Competition Research Paper No. 14-09, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2458362 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2458362

Frank Mueller-Langer (Contact Author)

University of the Bundeswehr Munich ( email )

Munich
Germany

Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition ( email )

Munich
Germany

European Commission, Joint Research Center

Seville
Spain

Patrick Andreoli Versbach

Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition ( email )

Marstallplatz 1
Munich, Bayern 80539
Germany

Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich (LMU) - Faculty of Economics ( email )

Ludwigstrasse 28
Munich, D-80539
Germany

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
138
Abstract Views
1,830
rank
265,021
PlumX Metrics