Jobs for the Boys? The Glass Ceiling and the Market for Corporate Control

29 Pages Posted: 25 Jun 2014 Last revised: 31 Oct 2016

See all articles by Ruth Mateos de Cabo

Ruth Mateos de Cabo

Universidad San Pablo CEU

Jens Hagendorff

University of Edinburgh - Business School

Ricardo Gimeno

Banco de España

Date Written: October 12, 2016

Abstract

Women and ethnic minority groups hold few boardroom positions. In this paper, we adopt a novel empirical strategy to test whether this is caused by a lack of suitable candidates for director positions or, alternatively, by discriminatory barriers that prevent these groups from progressing up the corporate hierarchy. We study the determinants of director appointments following completed mergers and acquisitions. As directors at the acquisition target will be considered for an appointment at the newly merged firm, our approach allows us to observe the characteristics of successfully appointed target directors jointly with the characteristics of directors who have not been appointed to the board of the merged firm. Our results show empirical evidence consistent with biases in the recruitment of female directors. These findings cannot be explained by director or by merger/firm characteristics. We find no evidence that ethnic minority directors are less likely to be appointed to the board of the merged firm.

Keywords: Mergers and Acquisitions; Director Retention; Board Diversity

JEL Classification: G34, J62, J63

Suggested Citation

Mateos de Cabo, Ruth and Hagendorff, Jens and Gimeno, Ricardo, Jobs for the Boys? The Glass Ceiling and the Market for Corporate Control (October 12, 2016). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2458545 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2458545

Ruth Mateos de Cabo (Contact Author)

Universidad San Pablo CEU ( email )

Julián Romea, 23
28003 Madrid, 28003
Spain

Jens Hagendorff

University of Edinburgh - Business School ( email )

University of Edinburgh
29 Buccleuch Place
Edinburgh, Scotland EH8 9JS
UNITED KINGDOM

Ricardo Gimeno

Banco de España ( email )

Madrid 28014
Spain

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