Single- and Double-Elimination All-Pay Tournaments

38 Pages Posted: 26 Jun 2014 Last revised: 3 Jun 2015

See all articles by Cary A. Deck

Cary A. Deck

University of Alabama - Department of Economics, Finance and Legal Studies

Erik O. Kimbrough

Chapman University - The George L. Argyros School of Business & Economics

Date Written: April 9, 2015

Abstract

Tournaments consisting of iterative matches are a common mechanism for determining how to allocate a prize. For this reason it is important to understand the behavioral as well as the theoretical properties of different tournament structures. Given that laboratory experiments have consistently found high levels of overbidding in contests, one might suspect that double-elimination tournaments would generate substantially more total investment than single-elimination tournaments despite the two types of tournaments generating theoretically equivalent expected aggregate investment. This paper reports a set of laboratory experiments designed to test this comparison. The results indicate that aggregate investment is similar between the two tournaments, despite behavioral differences in bidding strategies.

Keywords: All-pay auctions, tournaments, experiments

JEL Classification: C7, C9, D4, D7

Suggested Citation

Deck, Cary A. and Kimbrough, Erik O., Single- and Double-Elimination All-Pay Tournaments (April 9, 2015). Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2458664 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2458664

Cary A. Deck

University of Alabama - Department of Economics, Finance and Legal Studies ( email )

P.O. Box 870244
Tuscaloosa, AL 35487
United States

Erik O. Kimbrough (Contact Author)

Chapman University - The George L. Argyros School of Business & Economics ( email )

One University Dr
Orange, CA 92866
United States

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