Manufacturers' Competition and Cooperation in Sustainability: Stable Recycling Alliances

48 Pages Posted: 28 Jun 2014 Last revised: 28 Apr 2018

See all articles by Fang Tian

Fang Tian

University of Southern California - Marshall school of Business

Greys Sosic

University of Southern California - Marshall School of Business

Laurens Debo

Dartmouth College - Tuck School of Business

Date Written: April 19, 2018

Abstract

Rather than organizing disposal of consumer-generated waste themselves, many states and countries have passed legislation that makes producers responsible for the proper disposal (i.e., recycling) of the products they bring to the market. We study the stability of producers' strategies emerging under such legislation. In our paper, the producers compete with multiple, differentiated products in consumer markets, but may consider cooperating when recycling those products in order to benefit from economies of scale. Products made by different producers or sold in different markets might still be considered for joint recycling. Our main question is when and whether firm-based recycling strategies (i.e., separately recycling products falling under same brand) or market-based recycling strategies (i.e., separately recycling products falling in the same product category) emerge as stable outcomes. To that end, we analyze a series of simple producer-market configurations. We first look at an asymmetric market model with two producers making three products in two markets, and then at a symmetric market model with two producers competing with four products in two markets. Our results show that with intense market competition and differentiated market sizes, producers may recycle their products on their own without cooperating with others. In some instances, they can add a product from their competitor to their recycling mix. As these outcomes are never socially optimal, they may reduce social welfare. Otherwise, with less intense competition or more equitable market shares, all-inclusive (resp., market-based) recycling is most common stable outcome with high (resp., low) scale economies.

Suggested Citation

Tian, Fang and Sosic, Greys and Debo, Laurens, Manufacturers' Competition and Cooperation in Sustainability: Stable Recycling Alliances (April 19, 2018). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2459656 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2459656

Fang Tian

University of Southern California - Marshall school of Business ( email )

Marshall School of Business
BRI 401, 3670 Trousdale Parkway
Los Angeles, CA 90089
United States

Greys Sosic (Contact Author)

University of Southern California - Marshall School of Business ( email )

701 Exposition Blvd
Los Angeles, CA 90089
United States

Laurens Debo

Dartmouth College - Tuck School of Business ( email )

Hanover, NH 03755
United States

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