The European Court of Justice: Selling Us Short?

26 Pages Posted: 29 Jun 2014 Last revised: 17 Feb 2016

See all articles by Elizabeth Howell

Elizabeth Howell

London School of Economics - Law School

Date Written: April 28, 2014

Abstract

The conferral of powers on the European Securities Markets Authority (‘ESMA’) has involved tensions, particularly concerning the boundaries between national and EU powers. A case in point is the recently introduced European Short Selling Regulation: article 28 confers direct powers of intervention on ESMA in exceptional circumstances. Crucially, measures adopted by ESMA under article 28 prevail over measures taken by national regulators. Article 28’s adoption led to a UK challenge at the European Court of Justice seeking its annulment. However the court’s decision, delivered on 22 January 2014 upheld ESMA’s powers.

This paper examines this landmark decision and suggests that while some important consequences result from it in relation to the development of the European Banking Union, the decision is disappointing, not least for its brevity and failure to fully engage with the Advocate General’s arguments. Further the judgment also paves the way for future developments in ESMA’s and other EU bodies’ roles, whilst limiting the possibility of future legal challenges. Finally, the court’s affirmation of the legislative view is also part of a more general and worrying trend that has been evident in its case law over the last decade.

Keywords: short selling, ESMA, European Union

JEL Classification: G10, K22

Suggested Citation

Howell, Elizabeth, The European Court of Justice: Selling Us Short? (April 28, 2014). European Company and Financial Law Review (2014) Volume 11, Issue 3, Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper No. 44/2014, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2459815

Elizabeth Howell (Contact Author)

London School of Economics - Law School ( email )

Houghton Street
London WC2A 2AE, WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom

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