Abstract

https://ssrn.com/abstract=2460937
 


 



Principles for Macroprudential Regulation


Anil K. Kashyap


University of Chicago, Booth School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago

Dimitrios P. Tsomocos


University of Oxford - Said Business School and St. Edmund Hall; University of Oxford - Said Business School

Alexandros Vardoulakis


Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

June 30, 2014

Chicago Booth Research Paper No. 14-19

Abstract:     
The drafting of macroprudential regulation is largely being driven by the need by policy makers to meet timetables that have been agreed. The legislative drive is taking place without any clear theoretical framework to organise the objectives. In this article we propose two principles that any satisfactory framework ought to respect and then describe one specific model that embodies these principles. We explain the insights from this approach for regulatory design.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 10


Open PDF in Browser Download This Paper

Date posted: July 1, 2014  

Suggested Citation

Kashyap, Anil K. and Tsomocos, Dimitrios P. and Vardoulakis, Alexandros, Principles for Macroprudential Regulation (June 30, 2014). Chicago Booth Research Paper No. 14-19. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2460937 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2460937

Contact Information

Anil K. Kashyap (Contact Author)
University of Chicago, Booth School of Business ( email )
5807 S. Woodlawn Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
773-702-7260 (Phone)
773 702-0458 (Fax)

Chicago Booth School of Business Logo

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
773-702-7260 (Phone)
773-702-0458 (Fax)
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago ( email )
230 South LaSalle Street
Chicago, IL 60604
United States
Dimitrios P. Tsomocos
University of Oxford - Said Business School and St. Edmund Hall ( email ) ( email )
Park End Street
Oxford, OX1 1HP
Great Britain
+44 1865 288 932 (Phone)
+44 1865 288 805 (Fax)

University of Oxford - Said Business School ( email ) ( email )
Park End Street
Oxford, OX1 1HP
Great Britain
+44 1865 288 932 (Phone)
+44 1865 288 805 (Fax)

Alexandros Vardoulakis
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System ( email )
20th Street and Constitution Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20551
United States

Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 680
Downloads: 180
Download Rank: 131,082