Equilibrium Bid-Price Dispersion

Journal of Political Economy (forthcoming)

43 Pages Posted: 8 Jul 2014 Last revised: 20 Jul 2021

See all articles by Boyan Jovanovic

Boyan Jovanovic

New York University - Department of Economics

Albert J. Menkveld

Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam

Date Written: July 19, 2021


If bidding in a common-value auction is costly and if bidders do not know how many others are also bidding, all equilibria are in mixed strategies. Participation is probabilistic and bid prices are dispersed. The symmetric equilibrium is unique and yields simple analytic expressions. We use them to, for example, show that bid prices exhibit negative skewness. The expressions are further used to estimate the model based on bidding on an S&P500 security. We find that the number of bidders declined over time, making liquidity supply fragile.

Suggested Citation

Jovanovic, Boyan and Menkveld, Albert J., Equilibrium Bid-Price Dispersion (July 19, 2021). Journal of Political Economy (forthcoming), Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2463066 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2463066

Boyan Jovanovic

New York University - Department of Economics ( email )

19 w 4 st.
New York, NY 10012
United States

Albert J. Menkveld (Contact Author)

Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam ( email )

De Boelelaan 1105
Amsterdam, 1081HV
+31 20 5986130 (Phone)
+31 20 5986020 (Fax)

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