A Note on Itqs and Optimal Investment
Posted: 10 Feb 2001
Abstract
This paper considers the incentives to invest under an ITQ management regime when labor is rewarded by the so-called share system. It is shown that the share system is likely to result in overinvestment under ITQs. Labor market power of crew, reflected in a high labor share of the catch, might correct for this and might even prevent excessive investment when there is competition for a total catch quota.
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Hannesson, Rognvaldur, A Note on Itqs and Optimal Investment. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Vol 40, Pp. 181-188, 2000, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=246343
Rognvaldur Hannesson (Contact Author)
Norwegian School of Economics (NHH) ( email )
Helleveien 30
Bergen, NO-5045
Norway
+47 55 959 260 (Phone)
Norwegian School of Economics (NHH) - Department of Economics
Helleveien 30
N-5035 Bergen
Norway
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