Target Choice in Global Mobile Telephony: A Dyadic Approach

35 Pages Posted: 9 Jul 2014 Last revised: 7 Apr 2017

See all articles by Jörg Claussen

Jörg Claussen

Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich - Faculty of Business Administration (Munich School of Management); Copenhagen Business School - Department of Innovation and Organizational Economics

Rebecca Ermecke

Technische Universität München (TUM)

Tobias Kretschmer

Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich - Faculty of Business Administration (Munich School of Management); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Date Written: April 6, 2017

Abstract

We study target choice in the global telephony industry, focusing specifically on the creation of unique synergies between buyer and target through their dyadic relationships. We find that geographical proximity has the highest impact on acquisition likelihood, followed by technological similarities and asymmetric in bargaining power. These results suggest that buyers select targets that offer high maximum synergies with the buyer, are easy to integrate and relatively cheap to acquire.

Suggested Citation

Claussen, Jörg and Ermecke, Rebecca and Kretschmer, Tobias, Target Choice in Global Mobile Telephony: A Dyadic Approach (April 6, 2017). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2463758 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2463758

Jörg Claussen (Contact Author)

Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich - Faculty of Business Administration (Munich School of Management) ( email )

Kaulbachstr. 45
Munich, DE 80539
Germany

Copenhagen Business School - Department of Innovation and Organizational Economics ( email )

Kilevej 14A
Frederiksberg, 2000
Denmark

Rebecca Ermecke

Technische Universität München (TUM) ( email )

Arcisstrasse 21
Munich, 80333
Germany

Tobias Kretschmer

Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich - Faculty of Business Administration (Munich School of Management) ( email )

Kaulbachstr. 45
Munich, DE 80539
Germany

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

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